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Anti-Japanese Sentiment, International
Diplomacy, and the Texas Alien Land
Law of 1921
By Brent M. S. Campney

T he Japanese ‘invasion’ of Texas appears to be in full swing,”

reported a correspondent from the lower Rio Grande Valley (hereinafter,
the Valley) on January 7, 1921. The writer drew this conclusion from the
arrival a day earlier of two Japanese families who had been met at the
train station in the South Texas town of Harlingen by a mob who warned
the immigrants not to settle on the land that they had already purchased
in the vicinity. The alleged invasion continued with the arrival of
B. R. Kato, “another Japanese colonist from California, [who] reached
Brownsville today.” As Kato alighted from the train, an antagonistic
crowd informed him “that public sentiment made it impossible for
Japanese to colonize here and that trouble was probable if the attempt was
made.” Amid rumors that other Japanese immigrants were en route, local
white residents cautioned against such efforts; the reporter predicted that
the “Rio Grande district is apt to prove a hornet’s nest for the Japanese,
because the [white] natives of this region, which retains many aspects of
the old frontier, are more inclined to take ‘direct action’ than the [white]
people of California, where the dispute over the Japanese land holdings
has been largely confined to the legislature and the courts.”1
This article explores the responses of white citizens of Cameron and
Hidalgo Counties to the so-called Japanese invasion between October
1920 and January 1921, including threats of mob violence, the arousal
of public opinion, and the elevation and expansion of anti-Japanese
sentiment. Second, it examines the stereotypes of the Japanese people

“Start Invasion of Texas,” Kansas City (Mo.) Times, January 7, 1921, p. 1. Much of the primary
research for this study can be found in the Brent Campney Collection, which focuses on race relations in
South Texas, held at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Special Collections and Archives,
Edinburg Campus (finding aid available at https://archives.lib.utrgv.edu/repositories/2/resources/323).
The author thanks David C. Atkinson, Robert Hoppens, Shannon Pensa, and Charles Waite for their
contributions to this work. He also thanks the Office of Global Engagement at the University of
Texas Rio Grande Valley for a grant to complete this research.
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promoted by white Texans to justify these responses. Third, it compares
and contrasts the tepid responses of the anti-Japanese forces with those
of the mobs who had slaughtered ethnic Mexicans there in a 1915
massacre, and it ties these different responses to the international power,
prestige, and diplomatic leverage of the countries from which the victims
originated. Fourth, the study demonstrates how white people in the
Valley, in the state capital of Austin, and across Texas not only eliminated the perceived threat posed by the Japanese immigrants through
the passage of an alien land law barring them from landownership but
also stoked similar fears of a Japanese invasion among white residents of
neighboring states and prompted comparable responses. Finally, it
speculates on the implications of the findings for the historiography.
To meet these objectives, the study relies on a number of sources but
especially on newspapers published nationally, regionally, and locally.
With its focus on Japanese immigration into the Valley after World
War I, this article provides an antidote to two scholarly trends. First, it
challenges a bias toward the study of ethnic Japanese experiences in the
U.S. Far West (particularly along the West Coast), a characteristic of
Asian American historiography generally. Instead, this study addresses
Japanese experiences in South Texas and orients the story, as did some
contemporaries, toward the South and particularly toward the Gulf Coast
states like Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, while at the same time
contextualizing these experiences within the American West and
developments in California, Arizona, and New Mexico. Second, by
examining the 1920s, this study challenges a bias toward a focus on
internment during World War II, when the U.S. government imprisoned
all persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast.2 As a result, the
article demonstrates that decades earlier white Americans appealed
to the same stereotypes and exclusionary impulses used against the
Japanese during the internment, exacerbating tensions between Japan
and the United States, while the two countries were jockeying for power
and prestige in a world recently devastated by World War I, and laying
the groundwork for that better-known and wholesale suspension of the
rights of ethnic Japanese populations during World War II. At the outset,
however, the study provides an overview of Japanese immigration to the
United States and its impact on bilateral relations, describes the short
history of the Japanese in South Texas generally and in the two
easternmost counties in the Valley specifically, and summarizes the
2
But see also Jason Morgan Ward, “No Jap Crow: Japanese Americans Encounter the World
War II South,” Journal of Southern History, 73 (February 2007), 75–104.
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violent legacy of white supremacy in the Valley as expressed in the
ruthless suppression of ethnic Mexicans and African Americans.
Denied by their government the right to emigrate from Japan until
1866, Japanese immigrants did not begin arriving on the American
mainland, primarily in California, until the late nineteenth century. After
1900 they began migrating to the Golden State in larger numbers in
response to a shortage of agricultural laborers there due to the continued
ban on Chinese immigration after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the
movement of many white workers into nonagricultural employment, and
a marked increase in commercial agriculture. Sharing a strong cultural
capacity for collective action, the Japanese immigrants worked as family
units, showed considerable financial acumen, and stood together
steadfastly against injustice.3
According to U.S. law at the time, Japanese immigrants could not
become citizens, although many wanted to do so. This group constituted the
Issei generation. Their children, the Nisei, were American-born citizens. By
1910, Issei—like many other Californians—worked the land as owners,
tenants, or sharecroppers. They earned admiration and scorn for their ability
to work land that most white people viewed as unsuitable for cultivation.
Not surprisingly, Japanese farmers learned that their productivity was a
“mixed blessing.” “On the one hand,” write historians David J. O’Brien and
Stephen S. Fugita, “it clearly contributed to their economic mobility and
their eventual movement into middle class occupations . . . , but, at the same
time, it caused a good deal of resentment on the part of many white
farmers.” Despite boasting of natural superiority, white Americans feared,
as California attorney general U. S. Webb later contended, in 1922, that
the “‘American family reared along the lines of American traditions with
the father managing the farm, the mother presiding in the home, and the
children during their younger years attending school, cannot compete with
the Oriental farm life wherein children and mother join with the father in the
actual farm labor, and in addition do not enjoy conditions of life which are
demanded by the American standard of living.’”4
3
David J. O’Brien and Stephen S. Fugita, The Japanese American Experience (Bloomington,
Ind., 1991), 10–22, esp. 19. For recent work in Asian American history, see Gary Y. Okihiro,
Common Ground: Reimagining American History (Princeton, 2001); Edlie L. Wong, Racial
Reconstruction: Black Inclusion, Chinese Exclusion, and the Fictions of Citizenship (New York,
2015); Madeline Y. Hsu, The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority
(Princeton, 2015); Lon Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion: The Untold History of Anti-Asian
Racism in the United States (Chapel Hill, 2016); and David C. Atkinson, The Burden of White
Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States (Chapel Hill,
2016).
4
O’Brien and Fugita, Japanese American Experience, 21–23 (first, second, and third quotations
on 22; fourth quotation on 23).
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In 1909 Sidney G. P. Coryn, a writer for the Argonaut in San
Francisco, summarized the issue: “For many years the Japanese have
been an irritation in California. For many years the newspapers of the
state—and notably the San Francisco ‘Chronicle,’ a journal of
responsible conservatism—have drawn attention to the increasing
numbers of Japanese immigrants and the consequent injury to the interests of the country. Some five years ago these complaints came
energetically to a head. Statistics were compiled from the scanty material
at command, opinions were collected, and grievances stated, with the
result that the Japanese question became an issue of magnitude.” To
Coryn and to many white Californians, Japanese immigrants constituted
a fundamentally alien group of smart, sneaky outsiders whose aim was to
dispossess white people of their hard-earned assets. Although white
Americans claimed that their society was a meritocracy, Coryn betrayed
his fear that in a fair contest the Japanese migrants might overwhelm
white locals and take over the United States. As a result, white
Americans tilted the scale in their own favor, in order to win the contest,
by criticizing the Japanese for their successes. For example, white
residents of San Francisco had an abundance of complaints against the
Japanese in the city:
In many instances we need no deep research to see that the complaints are well
founded. Japanese shoe repairing shops, for instance, are to be found dotted all
over the city. Japanese laundries are nearly as numerous. There are hundreds of
Japanese janitors, and Japanese house cleaners, while the invasion of other
branches of activity is steady and persistent. Divisions of the city are becoming
known as Japanese quarters . . . . All these things mean the dispossession of white
men. . . . The presence of the Japanese trader means that the white man must either
go out of busines[s] or abandon his standard of comfort and sink to the level of the
Asiatic.5

Consistent with these fears, by 1913 state legislators had proposed
several bills to ban all aliens from purchasing land in California,
which drew opposition from European governments and foreign
investors. In response, California lawmakers restricted landownership in the final bill, which became law in 1913, to those “aliens
eligible to citizenship,” thereby targeting specifically the Japanese,
who were not “eligible,” without ever mentioning them by name.
While the 1913 law exacerbated anti-Japanese resentments in California, the legislators failed in their purpose. As David O’Brien and

5
Sidney G. P. Coryn, “The Japanese Problem in California,” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 34 (September 1909), 42–48 (first quotation on 42; second quotation
on 43).

THE TEXAS ALIEN LAND LAW OF 1921

845

Stephen Fugita note, “Some Issei put the land in the name of their
American-born children and made themselves their guardians. Or
they placed land in the name of legal-age children, usually Hawaiianborn Nisei, some of whom were just beginning to reach their
majority . . . . Some Issei created dummy corporations which had a
majority of American citizen shareholders.” The legislature closed
these loopholes in 1920 with a law that “prohibited the Issei from
owning or leasing land, being corporation shareholders, or acting as
guardians for minors owning or leasing land.” Voters in every county
of California approved it. Although some Japanese found ways to
skirt the new law, largely by illegal means, they suffered a shattering
blow.6
Compared with other immigrant groups, the Japanese enjoyed significant advantages. First, their country of origin actively protected the
rights of its citizens abroad, even if its motivation for doing so, as
historian Naoko Shimazu has demonstrated, was propelled more by the
advancement of Japan’s own prestige internationally than by a genuine
concern for the fortunes of individual emigrants themselves. Second,
Japan, as an ascendant world power, had recently demonstrated its
influence by defeating much larger adversaries in wars with China
(1894–1895) and Russia (1904–1905) and by imposing protectorate
status on Korea in 1910. Then, during World War I, as Walter LaFeber
has written, “No nation gained so much so cheaply from the carnage as
Japan.” In its role as Britain’s ally in Asia, Japan gained control over
German possessions across the Pacific. Shortly thereafter, the Canadian
prime minister stated what had become increasingly clear: “only ‘three
major powers’ remained in the world—the United States, Great Britain,
and Japan.”7
As a result of Japan’s growing influence, its government—backed by
its citizenry—protested loudly against racist laws aimed at Japanese
nationals in the United States. After white Californians threatened
to segregate Japanese children in schools in 1906–1907, a leading
6
“An act relating to the rights, powers and disabilities of aliens . . . with respect to property in this
state,” May 19, 1913, The Statutes of California and Amendments to the Codes, Passed at the
Fortieth Session of the Legislature, 1913 (Sacramento, Calif., 1913), 206–8 (first and second
quotations on 206); O’Brien and Fugita, Japanese American Experience, 22–26 (third and fourth
quotations on 24).
7
Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (New
York, 1998), esp. chap. 3; Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New
York, 1997), 99–128 (first quotation on 99; second quotation on 128). On Japanese ascendancy, see
S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (New
York, 2003). See also Sidney Pash, The Currents of War: A New History of American-Japanese
Relations, 1899–1941 (Lexington, Ky., 2014).
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newspaper in Tokyo declared that Japan had “‘been humiliated’” and
proposed that the government send warships to the U.S. West Coast.
Japan expressed its strong objections to the California measure through
diplomatic channels and gained concessions. Recognizing the economic
and military risks of a confrontation and “furious at the ‘idiots’ in
California,” U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt reached the so-called
Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, which spared Japanese schoolchildren
the indignity of segregation but curbed the flow of Japanese nationals to
the United States.8
When California legislators passed the alien land law in 1913, the
Japanese government and its people again protested. As Walter LaFeber
writes, President Woodrow Wilson “dispatched [Secretary of State
William Jennings] Bryan to talk sense with the state legislators.” After
the legislators ignored Bryan, twenty thousand Japanese took to the
streets of Tokyo to protest against the United States and to cheer “as a
politician urged that the Imperial Fleet steam to California to protect
Japan’s citizens and dignity.” Moreover, there were rumors that the fleet
was moving against Hawaii and the Philippines. In response, the Japanese government again protested the new California law. A U.S. Navy
admiral assessed the state of affairs and concluded that “‘war is not only
possible but even probable.’”9
Furthermore, Japan and the United States were locked in an imperial
contest that elevated the significance of clashes over immigration. As
Japan was humiliating China and Russia (its defeat of the latter was a
transcendent event in the West because a “nonwhite” nation defeated a
“white” one for the first time in modern warfare), the United States was
humiliating Spain in war and subsequently installing colonial practices
in Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and in the Philippines and
Guam in the Pacific. During this period, the United States also gained
control over Hawaii and secured a strong position in China. Amid
persistent speculation about the threats posed by Japan in the Western
Hemisphere and the hysteria inflamed by the American press, the United
States reacted swiftly in 1912 to the rumored purchase of “a strategic
area of Mexico’s Baja California” by Japanese business interests, a story
denied by the Japanese government. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
authored a resolution, which received overwhelming support in the
Senate, that asserted the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine—banning

8
9

LaFeber, Clash, 89.
Ibid., 104–6 (first and second quotations on 105; third quotation on 106).
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the intervention of colonial powers in the Western Hemisphere—to the
expansion of international corporations.10
In this scramble for influence, markets, and resources, the United
States blocked or marginalized Japan whenever possible. Frustrated by
and resentful of American opposition in the Pacific and the United
States’ overt racism, Japan demanded in the Treaty of Versailles a racial
equality clause that would require that the Western nations deal on an
equal basis with nonwhite nations. Concerned over Japanese ambitions
and fearful of the potential consequences of the clause among their own
nonwhite colonial subjects, the Western nations—led by the United
States and Australia—excluded the clause from the treaty. Furthermore,
shortly after the war the United States sided with China over control of
the Shandong Peninsula, which Japan had secured through the Treaty of
Versailles. Finally, for two decades after its passage, the United States
invoked the so-called Lodge Corollary on at least four occasions to
scuttle land purchases in Mexico by Japanese companies.11 Jilted, Japan
in the 1920s turned from a model of cooperation with the West toward
one predisposed toward nationalism and militarism—and, ultimately, to
conflict culminating in World War II.
Given their paranoia about Japanese immigration domestically and
their fear of Japanese power internationally, many white Americans
developed emotional and deeply ingrained stereotypes about the
Japanese. These stereotypes asserted that the newcomers were “from
such a different culture that they could never adopt American ways.” As
white Americans had done previously with the Chinese, they regarded
the Japanese as inherently and unalterably alien, as crafty and sneaky,
and as fifth columnists.12 The Dallas Morning News, covering testimony
in the Texas senate in 1921, expressed the argument that “[t]he inability
of the Japanese to assimilate in America, as well as his fixed racial and
religious differences, are given as the main reason why he is not wanted
as a citizen and a land owner.” Barred from American citizenship, “he
will forever remain an alien, and ‘once a Japanese, always a Japanese,’ is
10

Ibid., 57–62, 75–84, 104 (quotation).
Ibid., 120–27, 104.
O’Brien and Fugita, Japanese American Experience, 1. For studies of anti-Asian (pan-Asian
and specific Asian ethnic) stereotypes, see, for example, Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identity (Philadelphia, 1992); Mia Tuan, Forever Foreigners or
Honorary Whites?: The Asian Ethnic Experience Today (New Brunswick, N.J., 1998); Robert
G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia, 1999); John Kuo Wei Tchen,
New York before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776–1882
(Baltimore, 1999); Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern
America (New York, 2001); and Ellen D. Wu, The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the
Origins of the Model Minority (Princeton, 2014).
11
12
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a common expression.” With the recurrent clashes between the two
nations over immigration and empire, the American Legion warned that
Japanese immigration constituted a Trojan horse. “[I]n explaining to the
committee why the legion was opposed to Japanese settling in the United
States,” the Morning News reported, a legionnaire testified that “in event
of a war with Japan, which many profess to believe will eventually
occur, the colony of little brown men in our midst would be of great
assistance and comfort to the enemy.”13
In South Texas, whites confronted with hostility the few Japanese
who attempted to settle there in the early twentieth century. In 1907
white residents of San Antonio responded harshly to an influx of
migrants who had entered the United States at its southern border.
“There are many Japanese coming into Texas continually from Mexico
and hundreds of these are finding their way to San Antonio, where they
are meeting with a very chilly reception,” reported the Fort Worth
Telegram. “The hotels in that city refuse to receive the little brown men
as guests, notwithstanding the fact that they have money to defray the
expense of accommodation, and this is causing the new arrivals to sleep
out in the open at any old place they can snatch a few hours of slumber.
The police of that city are arresting these men.” Some whites offered
the Japanese migrants employment with terms that ruthlessly leveraged
their desperation. “The negroes [in San Antonio] have been working
at about an average of $4 per week and board and lodging,” reported
the Brownsville Daily Herald; “The Japs are taking the same jobs at $2
per week and do not object to sleeping in the barn with the horses.” As
a consequence, the newspaper claimed, African Americans in San
Antonio were pushing Japanese workers off the sidewalks, generally
abusing them, and “making threats openly to drive the Japanese out
of the city.” By pitting minority groups against each other, white
employers in San Antonio wrung financial concessions from black
workers, while offering the Japanese little protection from the affronted
black population. South Texas was a complex multiracial environment in which white supremacists dominated ethnic Mexican, black,
and Asian populations in part by turning them against each other
and encouraging them to express and act upon their own racial
prejudices.14
13

p. 6.

John Sneed, “Alien Land Bill Causes Agitation,” Dallas Morning News, February 6, 1921,

14
“Arresting Japs in San Antonio,” Fort Worth (Tex.) Telegram, February 6, 1907, p. 6 (first and
second quotations); “Japs Take Jobs from Negroes,” Brownsville (Tex.) Daily Herald, January 28,
1907, p. 1 (third, fourth, and fifth quotations).
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According to Hisako Ochiai, very few Japanese settled in the Valley
in the early twentieth century; the first appears to have been Heishiro
Miyamoto, who arrived in Hidalgo County in 1908. In addition to
Miyamoto, who later partnered with M. Tsuno, three more Japanese
immigrants came in 1909, leasing land for a three-year period. Unfortunately, Ochiai writes, “there are no further records available to trace
the fate” of these Japanese “pioneers.” Over the next nine years, a total of
twenty more Japanese immigrants arrived as individuals, couples, or
families. Then, in 1919 a somewhat larger group of seven Japanese
families bought 389 acres of land owned by the local Brulay family and
located near Brownsville.15
Given their very small numbers over the decade or so before
World War I, the Japanese living in the Valley attracted relatively little
hostility. As a Japanese American from the region later recalled, “‘What
I faced was not prejudice at all, but the curiosity of native [white]
Americans.’”16 Nevertheless, local whites seemed cognizant of the
Japanese presence, as revealed in 1921 when a white community leader
in San Benito, Texas, reckoned that some fifteen to twenty families lived
in Cameron and Hidalgo Counties and was able to locate each of them
with geographical precision. With his recall of numbers and locations, he
compromised his claim that the earlier immigrants had attracted little
attention.17 With the white reaction to the “invasion” of immigrants in
1920–1921, no white person generally could claim indifference.
In the early twentieth century, white migrants to the Valley—many of
whom were midwesterners and southerners—wrested control of the
region from its largely ethnic Mexican inhabitants through a ruthless and
multifaceted campaign.18 When the railroad arrived in 1904, connecting
the region to national and international markets, powerful white agricultural interests converged on the Valley and, using chicanery, fraud,
and intimidation, seized lands held by Mexican Americans in what had
long been a ranching area. Within a decade white arrivals had gobbled up
the land and resources from Mexican Americans and put the latter, as
15
Hisako Ochiai, “The Community of the Japanese Americans in the Rio Grande Valley” (M.A.
thesis, Texas A&I University, 1974), 32–40 (quotations on 35).
16
Ibid., 37.
17
“Legion Men Hopeful of Law to Bar Japs,” San Benito (Tex.) Light, February 5, 1921, p. 1.
18
In writing Mexican American and South Texas history, it is customary to use the term Anglo
rather than white to describe the dominant group because, under U.S. law, persons of Mexican
descent are classified as white, even if they rarely enjoyed in practice the benefits of that identity.
Given the central focus here on relations between the United States and Japan, and the role of global
white supremacy in shaping that relationship, this article employs the word with greater currency in
an international context by using the term white.
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well as increasing numbers of desperate and more easily exploitable
Mexicans from across the border, to work as stoop labor on lands that
Mexican Americans had recently owned.19
White residents of the Valley consolidated their control through the
slaughter of at least three hundred, and perhaps a thousand or more,
Mexican Americans and Mexicans in a slow-rolling massacre in 1915.
Under the pretext of putting down the Plan de San Diego uprising, white
posses roamed the Rio Grande Valley from July until October, killing
alleged rebels—who included virtually any person of Mexican descent
encountered by a posse—and burning their houses. Ultimately, these
white vigilantes drove substantial numbers of Mexican Americans and
Mexicans across the border into Mexico, a republic then being torn apart
by the Mexican Revolution. After the massacre, whites took advantage
of the climate of fear to impose an increasingly harsh brand of discrimination against people of Mexican descent in all sectors of life.20
On New Year’s Eve in 1920 in McAllen, Texas, just a week before the
so-called Japanese invasion, white civilians and authorities, along with
many ethnic Mexicans, revealed their capacity for racist mob violence.
Amid open antiblack hostility, unknown parties killed several Mexican
Americans near the town, a crime that other residents assigned to black
perpetrators. In response, a hostile crowd of whites and ethnic Mexicans
formed, giving municipal authorities—who were openly taking sides
with the mob—an opportunity to tell local black people to leave town, a
warning that many of them followed during the hours when 1920 turned
into 1921. “A general exodus of all negroes from McAllen, under threat
of possible mob violence,” was one of the “high spots in a miniature
‘crime wave’ that ushered in the New Year” there, reported the Corpus
Christi Times; “There was a large negro colony here and so far as is
known not a member remained in the city last night.” “Feeling against
the blacks has been growing for some time,” it added. “Fearing trouble
19
On this chronology of events, see, for example, Timothy Paul Bowman, Blood Oranges:
Colonialism and Agriculture in the South Texas Borderlands (College Station, Tex., 2016), 3–7,
25–26.
20
On the 1915 massacre, see Benjamin Heber Johnson, Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten
Rebellion and Its Bloody Suppression Turned Mexicans into Americans (New Haven, 2003). On
racist violence against ethnic Mexicans in South Texas more generally, see Nicholas Villanueva Jr.,
The Lynching of Mexicans in the Texas Borderlands (Albuquerque, 2017); and Monica Muñoz
Martinez, The Injustice Never Leaves You: Anti-Mexican Violence in Texas (Cambridge, Mass.,
2018). On African Americans in South Texas, see Bruce A. Glasrud, ed., African Americans in
South Texas History (College Station, Tex., 2011). On the relationships between whites and ethnic
Mexicans in South Texas more generally, see David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the
Making of Texas, 1836–1986 (Austin, 1987); Bowman, Blood Oranges; and John Weber, From
South Texas to the Nation: The Exploitation of Mexican Labor in the Twentieth Century (Chapel
Hill, 2015).
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on the part of Mexican residents and some [white] Americans,” the
police chief “warned the negroes to leave the city.”21
With the massacre in 1915 and episodes like the McAllen expulsion, not
to mention several other anti-Mexican lynchings in the intervening period,
the Rio Grande Valley, a place where armed vigilantes roamed and ethnic
minorities fled, was among the most mob-violence-prone areas in the
World War I–era United States (Map 1). As Brownsville native and
borderlands scholar Américo Paredes wrote in a 1958 reflection on Laredo,
which was equally applicable to other areas of South Texas, “the north
bank of the Rio Grande” marked the edge of a “lynching belt” through
which ethnic Mexicans tiptoed surreptitiously.22 Clearly, then, the
Japanese settlers entered the “hornet’s nest” in the Valley at a time when,
as a national correspondent recognized, the white “natives of this region”
were inclined to take “‘direct action’” to defend their interests.23
In October 1920 news spread that South Texas real estate developer
F. Z. Bishop had sold 280 acres of land near Harlingen to a Japanese
broker in Los Angeles, named B. Yamada, who planned to sell it to
Japanese immigrants seeking to leave the Golden State. “A rumor that
appears to be widespread is to the effect that Japanese, fearing the
passage of the anti-alien land-owning bill in California, are looking to
Texas for colonization,” worried the San Benito Light, a racially conservative newspaper in San Benito, Texas, located less than ten miles
from the property in question. When it became clear that there was truth
to the rumor, many whites shared the view expressed by a Harlingen
resident and American Legion post commander. “We are not looking for
trouble and don’t want it,” he declared. “But if the Japs come, I can safely
say, from the temper of public opinion in the Valley, it will mean a fight.”
Bishop insisted that he would on principle complete the deal with the
investors “‘if it takes the [Texas Rangers] and the state militia to do it!’”
However, he also promised that he would sell no more land to the
Japanese, “since he had seen how strong the public sentiment is against
it. He was completely unaware of its strength, he declared, until ‘I called
that mass meeting and they almost mobbed me.’”24
21
“M’Allen Murders Cause Exodus of All Negroes,” Corpus Christi (Tex.) Times, January 5,
1921, p. 2.
22
Américo Paredes, “With His Pistol in His Hand”: A Border Ballad and Its Hero (Austin,
1958), 78. On the lynching of ethnic Mexicans in South Texas and across the U.S. Southwest, see
William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence against Mexicans in the
United States, 1848–1928 (New York, 2013).
23
“Start Invasion of Texas,” Kansas City Times, January 7, 1921, p. 1.
24
“F. Z. Bishop in Interview Is Quoted as Saying Deal with Orientals Will Be Completed,” San
Benito Light, October 29, 1920, p. 1.
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MAP 1
White Mob Violence in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, 1915–1922

Note: Documenting acts of racist violence against Japanese immigrants, ethnic
Mexicans, and African Americans, this map underscores the level of social discord
in the lower Rio Grande Valley between 1915 and 1922. Because it includes the
killings of ethnic Mexicans by mobs documented in Forgotten Dead by William
D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, supplemented by the killings in Rio Hondo (1921) and
Mercedes (1922) identified in this study, and not the many killings perpetrated by
Texas Rangers or by lone white vigilantes, the map illustrates only a fraction of the
actual number of such executions of ethnic Mexicans.
Sources: William D. Carrigan and Clive Webb, Forgotten Dead: Mob Violence
against Mexicans in the United States, 1848–1928 (New York, 2013); Brent Campney Collection (University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Special Collections and Archives, Edinburg Campus). Map by Erin Greb Cartography.

Within a few weeks white Valley residents relaxed, concluding
that the “undertaking to bring Japanese here for colonization purposes
had been quietly abandoned, in view of the storm of opposition it
raised.” They discovered their error on December 21 when they learned
that Bishop had, as promised, sold the land and that the buyers would
soon arrive. Over the next several weeks a handful of Japanese
migrants—perhaps two or three dozen individuals at most—filtered
into the region. One family arrived at a farm near Santa Maria, joining
three other earlier Japanese settlers. Another Japanese family and a
single Japanese man materialized nearby in a search for land. A lone
laborer, the aforementioned B. R. Kato, arrived in Brownsville,
expecting to work on a nearby farm. In the most publicized arrival, the
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Okuma family, consisting of two brothers, their wives, and four
children, arrived in Harlingen to settle the property purchased from
Bishop. “Texans met [the] incoming Japanese families and told them
of the white man’s sorrow that the yellow men could make no longer
visit than a night,” an observer quipped.25
Members of the American Legion, the national veterans’ organization formed in 1919, led the protests. “The San Benito post of the
American Legion today took steps to perfect the organization of a
central executive committee, representing all posts in the Valley, to
handle in a comprehensive way the Japanese situation,” noted the
Light. Its members roamed the countryside, menacing the few Japanese
already settled and demanding the departure of the new arrivals. They
also sent messages to absentee owners of land occupied by the
Japanese requesting the “authority to oust the ‘squatters’”; as journalists reported, “trouble is feared if the permission is given.” The
San Benito Legionnaires mobilized against the influx in other ways as
well. One member announced that “out of 650 questionnaires” distributed to local residents, “over 250 answers had already been received.” This was regarded as “a very high percentage of replies in
such a short notice,” and, he predicted, “we shall soon have over 50
percent of answers. The sentiment of those who have replied is
overwhelmingly opposed to Japanese colonization here.” When
Kato arrived in Brownsville, “a committee of the chamber of commerce, American Legion, retail merchants’ association and farmers’
organizations . . . told [him] to leave within forty-eight hours.”26
Although the local Legion post organized the response and clearly
reflected the views of the region’s prominent businessmen and farmers,
its members exemplified white attitudes generally. “Considerable antiJapanese sentiment has developed in Rio Grande Valley towns during
the past two months,” remarked the San Antonio Express. The San Benito
Light agreed, stating that “Japs will not be welcomed in Harlingen or at
other Valley points.” A Legion post commander from San Antonio
declared, “‘There is a strong sentiment against the settlement by
25
“Valley Stirred by Discovery That Japanese Have Warranty Deed to Land Near Harlingen,”
San Benito Light, December 21, 1920, p. 1 (first quotation); “Plans Made to Check the ‘Peaceful
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Japanese of Texas lands existing throughout the State. . . . A flood of
protests has been received by myself and other members of Alamo Post
in which residents from various sections of the State expressed themselves strongly opposed to allowing Japanese from California or any
other State to take up lands in Texas.’” By January 1 the Light had
expressed its satisfaction (or at least its hope) that white Valley residents
who were initially indifferent to the Japanese had come to embrace more
conservative views: “Now that we are all together, let’s keep together
and see that the Valley is to be a little section of America that is kept safe
for Americans.” Two weeks later, the Light added that “it would be folly
to relax for one moment in our determination to keep the Lower Rio
Grande Valley for the white race.”27
With the arrival of the Okumas in Harlingen on January 6, white
locals began a standoff that continued for three weeks. As the San Benito
Light reported, “Legion men of Harlingen met the Japs at the station and
told them of the sentiment in the Valley.” They at least hinted at—and
probably stated overtly—their willingness to use violence to prevent the
Okuma family from occupying the land. “Upon advice of the Legion
men the Japs made no attempt to go to the farm they had purchased and
did not order their household goods and farm implements unloaded,”
noted the Light. Instead they “agreed” to remain in a hotel while the
matter was being resolved. In saying that the Japanese family “agreed” to
delay the move, the newspaper minimized the menacing nature of the
crowd.28 “Gathering in small groups in the town, knots of men are
discussing the crisis in guarded tones,” observed a correspondent
published in the Kansas City Times. “Legion representatives have told
the Japanese that they themselves mean to keep strictly within the law”
but were “not convinced that they can control public sentiment, which, in
the case of some of the farmers and truck men, is decidedly fiery.”29
For the remainder of January, the Okumas lived in fear in the hotel. At
the same time, white residents of the Valley warned them to avoid any
move likely to result in bloodshed and urged them to “vamoos[e]
pronto.” Having spent their fortunes on land from which they were
barred, the Okumas fluctuated between demands that their rights be
27
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recognized and laments that their departure was impossible. The
Legionnaires, for their part, believed “that the Japs . . . are sincere in their
desire to get away.” While the Okumas lived as hostages, local whites
intimidated the other Japanese people in the area. Some visited “the old
Rabb ranch near Santa Maria late yesterday to interview the Jap families
there,” observed the Light on January 8. “The trip was made for the
purpose of impressing upon the family that arrived only a few days ago
for a ‘visit’ that it was expected they would visit only for a limited time.”
In Brownsville, others chased Kato away moments after he alighted from
the train. The Light framed this confrontation as more gentlemanly than
it probably was: “Kato said he had merely gone to Brownsville to work
on the old Brulay place, now owned by Jap growers, but added that if
Brownsville people thought there were already enough Japs in that
vicinity he would not remain.”30
The drama in South Texas was now national news.31 Consequently,
S. Kishi, the Japanese realtor in California who had sold the Texas land
to the Okuma brothers, announced that he would travel to the Valley to
resolve the dispute. He faced a dangerous task. When he failed to arrive
as anticipated, the San Benito Light speculated on his whereabouts.
When he missed a meeting in Harlingen, the Legion “men who were
there as a reception and information committee, to give Kishi some
correct data regarding the Valley’s anti Jap sentiment are still puzzled as
to what became of him.” They concluded that Kishi, “mistaking a party
of about 300 . . . who happened to be at the station for a fully organized
[Asiatic] Society [an anti-Japanese mob],” made “himself scarce” and
continued on to Brownsville. “Legion men there, however, made a
search of the train. It failed to yield any trace of the missing Kishi.” On
January 17, however, the newspaper reported that the Okuma brothers,
along with the now present Kishi, had toured their land before returning
to the hotel.32
Notwithstanding the San Benito Light’s certainty that all white people
in the Valley were now unified in their anti-Japanese sentiment, there
30
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were some who were not. In Hidalgo County, where the Japanese
presence was even smaller than in Cameron, some mused that such an
influx might be good for the economy amid the deep economic recession
roiling Texas and the United States generally after World War I. Others
argued that the Japanese had demonstrated strong capabilities as farmers.
“Up around McAllen . . . there is a very marked lack of interest in efforts
to prevent Japanese colonization,” the Light scowled. “Certain more or
less influential residents in that neighborhood have been active in
speaking a word here and there in favor of land selling to the Japanese
claiming, it is alleged, that more Japanese in idle Valley land would be
‘good business.’” A McAllen newspaper (reprinted in San Benito)
assailed what it regarded as local race-traitors by mocking such moneygrubbing arguments as “We need money now. And the Japs can bring
it.”33
Faced with the anger and incredulity of neighbors and friends, many
of these so-called race-traitors swiftly modified their views, adopting the
anti-Japanese line rather than suffer marginalization in the community.
One Cameron County resident who had recently rented land to a
newcomer promised that he would not do so again. “[He] declared that
his position was one against all Japanese settlement in the Valley, but
that if the sentiment over the district was not so strongly against the
orientals that they could not rent any land he would rather rent to a Jap
than permit the land to lie idle.” Now that he had gauged the public
temper, he maintained “that if the people of that community would agree
on not letting the Japs in he would assist in every way in keeping the bars
up.” Another white resident proudly reported that he had “refused to sell
mules to the new Jap [in his neighborhood] and had told him he was not
wanted.”34
To combat what they characterized as “apathy” in McAllen,
American Legion posts in the Valley ramped up their efforts “to arouse
sentiment against Japanese colonization” and to remedy the perceived
“lack of understanding there regarding the Jap menace.” Three days later
the San Benito Light noted reports from “up Valley” that showed a
continuing “lack of interest in the campaign to prevent the Japanese
colonization and in some quarters a quiet but definite movement in favor
33
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of land sales or leases to them,” a situation that the newspaper considered
“beyond the comprehension of people in this part of the Valley.” It
charged that upper Rio Grande Valley residents “who are not strongly
opposed to Japanese colonization are not familiar with the issue.” The
Light scorned those in McAllen who refused to “profit by California’s
experience” and insisted on being “lulled into a false sense of security by
Jap promises or by scoffing Americans who profess to see the ‘Jap peril’
as a monumental joke.”35 In all likelihood white McAllen residents—the
more influential ones, anyway—were more receptive to the Japanese
presence because of a pro-growth orientation that eventually made
McAllen the economic center of the Valley. However, as suggested by
the expulsion of the town’s entire black population just a week before the
arrival of the Japanese in the Valley, whites in McAllen could mobilize
behind racist violence, if that served their purposes.
A few days before the end of January, Kishi and the Okumas “told
Legion men they intended to take immediate possession of their recently
purchased property.” The Legionnaires responded that “they had a legal
right to do so but repeated the advice previously given them.” Finally, on
January 31 Kishi and the Okuma clan boarded a northbound train and left
without announcing their destination or their intentions. “Legion men
who met the Okumas [three] weeks ago upon their arrival and advised
them that sentiment in Harlingen was strongly opposed to Japanese were
somewhat surprised at their sudden departure,” the Light observed. “The
Valley has won its fight so far by impressing upon the Japanese that they
are not wanted and will not be made welcome.” With unexpected
suddenness “Harlingen’s ‘Japanese Problem’ disappeared.”36
To justify their demands for Japanese exclusion, white Texans articulated the stereotypes deployed against the Japanese across the
country. The Dallas Morning News reported from the statehouse in
Austin, “There is much talk about the Japanese being undesirable as
citizens, but very little reason has been given, except that they are
‘unassimilable.’” A man in Harlingen reasoned, “You can’t tell about a
Jap.” Another observer claimed that “all history” showed that radically
different peoples could not “amalgamate” or “live peaceably together.”
Accordingly, “The people of the Lower Rio Grande have no desire to try
35
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to prove the contrary.” It was a classic case of blaming the victims. As
Saburo Arai, a Japanese man from Harris County, Texas, testified before
the state legislature, white Texans accused Japanese immigrants—banned
from becoming citizens—“of hoarding fortune, only to return to their
native country with amassed wealth.”37
Like other white Americans, whites in the Valley regarded the
Japanese as smart and sneaky, as people who could beat white Americans
at their own games and amass influence and wealth through devious
means. “Japs are as insincere in their promises to Americans as they are
persistent,” declared the San Benito Light. “These, in fact, are their chief
characteristics.” Hence, they were “not easy to cope with.” Possessing “a
craftiness that at times borders onto the uncanny, the Japs have won
fight after fight that has been waged against them on the coast,” the
Light complained. “And they are still fighting and finding new loopholes
in the laws that have been enacted to keep them from spreading their
influence and entirely overrunning the American farmer.”38
Just as white people in the Far West had worried earlier that the
Chinese would multiply quickly and overwhelm them, so, too, did white
Texans worry that the Japanese would crowd them out. Citing the
example of Hawaii, the Corpus Christi Caller argued that the Japanese
had grown to nearly half the population since the first arrival of the
“yellow men” in the 1880s. Turning to California, the Caller applauded
the people there who anticipated “the day when the Japanese shall overrun and swamp it,” too, and the California government that had
addressed the menace through its alien land laws. “What California and
the west coast have been doing,” the newspaper continued, “must be
done all over the country if we would heed the warning writ plain upon
the wall by events in Hawaii.” Eager to check Japanese immigration, the
Caller urged that “[t]here is no occasion for a clash with Japan.” But, it
maintained, “Self-preservation is the first law of nature. Preservation of
this country for those who shall inherit it when we are gone is a solemn
duty we may not evade.”39
Local white Texans viewed the Japanese settlers as the advance guard
of an effort to take over the Rio Grande Valley in essentially the same
37
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way that whites had seized the region from ethnic Mexicans. Antiimmigrant speakers in the Cameron County town of Los Indios described this approach, in a popular phrase of the period, as the Japanese
method of “peaceful penetration.” The San Benito Light ribbed the racetraitors in McAllen for their capacity to be duped. It was, the newspaper
asserted, “this same viewpoint and this same argument that paved the
way for California’s present problem. It was the owner of land who did
not or could not cultivate it and who pretended to believe it better to
lease or sell to Japanese than to allow it to remain idle, who in reality
painted a yellow streak through California’s richest and most productive
regions.”40
Given the frosty relations between the United States and Japan, whites
in the Valley also regarded the settlers as spies seeking to obtain intelligence and exploit weakness. “Acquisition of land in the Valley, there
is every reason to believe, was done in accordance with the policy of the
Japanese government and of the Japanese people to colonize favorable sections of the United States and permanently establish their race
in this country,” speculated the Light. Citing a U.S. government report,
the newspaper added that Japan had established “in this country powerful
associations through which she is controlling the acts and policies of
all Japanese here and exerting organized effort in the interests of . . . the
dominant military party of Japan for world conquest.” Similarly, the
McAllen Sun insisted that the Japanese settler “may take from the soil much
wealth, and he may take from the border many secrets to the [Tokyo]
government.” To the race-traitors who “preach[ed] of the money advantages that will be brought” by the Japanese, a Legionnaire suggested that
they consider the welfare of their country over their pocketbooks: “It
endangers this border in the event of Japanese trouble.”41
Whites also regarded the Japanese as potential saboteurs. Legion men
spent weeks compiling evidence that they claimed would prove that
behind the Japanese interest in the Valley lurked “a well developed plot
that assumed alarming international proportions.” Stressing the “danger
of allowing the Japs to get a foothold in the lower Valley,” they “pointed
out that fording the Rio Grande river is easy of accomplishment because
of the vast stretches of unguarded territory and that it was unreasonable
40
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to expect the immigration officials could prevent a veritable influx of
Japanese into this country through Mexico if allowed to settle in the
Valley.” The McAllen Sun likewise worried that “the Japanese government desires to have some of its smartest, shrewdest men become
entrenched very near the international border.” The Japanese, it added,
were “coming into this border country and creating bases for secret
preparations and activities against the American flag.”42
Due to these fears of espionage and sabotage, rumors of international
intrigue began to circulate. “Harlingen Legion men and members and
officials of the Chamber of Commerce are investigating a letter received
there late yesterday alleging a scheme to acquire large tracts near
Harlingen for the purpose of forming a million dollar Japanese colony
which, the writer declared, was to be financed by the Japanese government and the wealthy Japanese of California,” the Light reported. The
letter writer claimed that, as a clerk for a real estate company in San
Antonio, he had learned that the conspirators, “including ‘a German,’
were trying to get control of large acreage in the Valley with a view of
colonizing it with Japs.”43 Brownsville attorney Harbert Davenport
claimed “that the Japanese were increasing daily [in Texas] and that
entrance was being made through Mexico at an alarming rate.”
Reviewing recent conflicts between the United States and Japan, the
McAllen Sun lodged its annoyance with Mexico, asserting that “we
have, as a government, protested against [its] permitting the Japs to
colonize in that country. . . . We regard it as unfriendly on Mexico’s part
to permit great numbers of Japs to gather near the international border,
where they could accomplish so much against America quickly when
trouble starts.”44
Similarly, the San Benito Light recalled the limited involvement of a
few Japanese immigrants in the Plan de San Diego uprising in 1915 and
42
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used that evidence as a reminder about their probable involvement in
some future confrontation. In making its case against the Japanese
immigrants, the newspaper asserted that their settlements “on the Texas
bank of the Rio Grande soil” would permit “the Japanese, if they so
desire, [to] foment ill-feeling between the United States and Mexico.” As
proof it added that in 1915 “a detachment of United States signal corps
men was attacked and cut up at Ojo de Agua by a band of Mexican
bandits. Five of the bandits were left dead on the field, and one of them
was a Japanese. Another Japanese was reported dying on the Mexican
side of the Rio Grande.”45
Reflecting their views of the Japanese in the United States as fifth
columnists eager to destroy America from the inside out, Valley whites
regarded the Japanese individuals in this land drama as wealthy, wily
con men masquerading as oppressed minorities but focused on the
appropriation of resources rightfully belonging to white Americans.
The Light described Kato as “a stylishly dressed and diamond
bedecked Jap who declared he was merely a poor farm laborer.” It
differentiated between the realtor, Kishi, and the land broker, Yamada,
by calling the first the “dapper, well dressed, suave and well educated
Jap” and the second the “millionaire Jap of California.” A member of
the American Legion shared a similar view of the Okumas, who had
been banned from occupying their land and forced to live in a hotel.
“We don’t believe that talk about them being poor,” he asserted, “for
they are still at the hotel and poor people can’t pay hotel bills these days
for families like theirs.”46 Evidently, he never considered the fact that
he and his colleagues were imposing a financial hardship on a family
who had no choice but to expend their resources on hotel bills because
they could not take possession of their land. While the Okumas were
hiding in the hotel awaiting resolution to their ordeal, Hisako Ochiai
writes, “a boxcar containing farm machine and household goods,
45
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shipped by the Okuma families arrived. They had promised the local
people not to attempt to unload the goods for the present so the car was
kept on the railroad tracks in Harlingen. Freight charge on the car
amounted to $875 and demurrage of five dollars per day was charged
on the car.”47
As in California, white people in the Valley feared that they could not
compete with the Japanese immigrants. According to one journalist,
locals admitted that the Japanese farmer was “industrious and thrifty and
unexcelled as an agriculturalist. He reclaims waste land that the American
farmer would not care to cultivate.” Writing from Brownsville, another
journalist described the consequences of that realization. White residents
“fear that [the] Japanese, because of their ability to operate farms and
truck gardens at lower labor costs, will gradually drive out competition.”
Furthermore, he added, that fear was so pervasive that it “is openly
expressed and it is arousing a feeling of bitterness among the [white]
natives, both in towns and country districts.” The few Valley advocates
of Japanese immigration recognized this fear and the anger that flowed
from it. As one Valley resident remarked, “‘I know the Japs and what
they can do. I know that they are better farmers than the American
farmers. These American farmers are afraid to put their farming up
against the Jap kind.’”48 Rather than compete in accordance with their
professed beliefs in meritocracy, white Americans preferred to exclude
the competition, damn the economic consequences, and privilege
supposed national security.
In the forefront of this debate was the San Benito Light, already
furious at the race-traitors in McAllen. It argued that economic
calamity was preferable to Japanese settlement. “Better that every acre
of the Valley remain unwatered and covered with brush and cactus
than to allow it to be converted into a principality of Japan, populated
and controlled by aliens incapable of understanding or maintaining
American institutions and ready if called upon to take up arms against
them,” it argued. “Far fetched? Not in the least. One has only to study
the history of the Japanese penetration of southern California and to
probe conditions in some of its most productive counties to learn that
the Japanese issue is a real and vital one.” The fact that the “Japanese
themselves admit that what they have done in California they hope to
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do here,” it continued, “should be enough to make every man who
gives a hang for his fellow man, his state or his country line up solidly
with the American Legion and those individuals who are resolved to
keep the Valley white.”49
Because of its recent and virulent anti-Japanese racism, the departure
of the Okumas a week earlier, or perhaps some other motive, the Light
published on February 7 a somewhat conciliatory editorial that demonstrated its recognition of Japan’s formidable power. “The Japanese
think we don’t like them, and profess to be worried about it. . . . We seek
no trouble with Japan,” the editorial contended. It justified the newspaper’s previous condemnations of that country’s aggression, writing,
“We didn’t like the Shantung [Shandong] grab because we were sorry
for China, and the Korean massacres are disgusting to us because of their
barbarity.” (Tellingly, it made no comparable references to American
atrocities in the Philippines twenty years earlier.) “So long as the
Japanese do not become a distinct world menace,” the editorial continued, “the people of the Unit[e]d States will have no special interest
whatever in them.” If the view of most Americans could be encapsulated,
it would be one “not of ‘watchful waiting,’ but ‘simply of waiting’” to
see “what the Japanese do in their new-won position in world affairs.”
“Actually,” the editorial concluded, “the fate of Japanese-American
relations is in the hands of the Japanese themselves.”50
Reflecting their recognition of Japan’s power, white Texans who
had slaughtered ethnic Mexicans just a few years earlier in the Valley
made only vague threats of violence against the Japanese settlers.
White people in Brownsville advised Kato to leave within forty-eight
hours but did not assault him. White residents of Harlingen held the
Okumas as informal captives, warning them to leave but using no force
to ensure that outcome. In fact, leading opponents of the Japanese
settlements actually downplayed the possibility of violence. As the
Light reported, “‘Contrary to a general impression which has got
around,’ S. H. Crews, the commander of the local post said today, ‘the
American Legion is determined to find a solution to this matter in some
way that is both peaceable and effective. We realize that it is a very
difficult and delicate matter and, while we are determined to prevent
Japanese colonization here, we want to do so in a way that will prevent
embarrassment to all concerned.’” Another veteran declared that “there
had been too much loose talk about violence. The American Legion
49
50
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stands for law and order, he said, and would continue to stand for it.”51
While some elements of these crowds surely wanted violence, they
were restrained by the leaders of the movement, who were men of some
prominence locally.
During the Harlingen standoff, the Japanese consul in Chicago sent a
telegram to the “town officer” of Harlingen, demanding a report and
giving the affair “[a]n international aspect.” The diplomat wrote, “‘By
news, certain Japanese families [who have] arrived [in] your town have
been warned by committee of citizens and American Legion that [it]
would be dangerous to settle on the land. Please wire particulars.’” The
consul and his telegram infuriated Valley whites—but they responded not
with violence but with exasperation and renewed assurances of their
commitment to nonviolence. “Members of the Harlingen post [of the
American Legion] were indignant today over the receipt of a telegram
signed by the Japanese consul in Chicago asking whether violence was
being offered Jap subjects,” reported the Light. “The message was ignored, Legion men seeing it as a piece of gross impertinence.” Gross
impertinence or not, a leader of the group felt compelled to issue a
statement that “Legion men are doing everything in their power to prevent
violence and to protect the Japs.” Despite evidence to the contrary, he
concluded, “We are certainly not accountable to a Jap consul.”52
Notwithstanding their bluster, Valley whites recognized that the views
of the Japanese government were consequential. For that reason, they
waited with sullen irritation while their victims considered possible
options. According to a “report published in a Houston paper,” one
Japanese immigrant “was remaining in Harlingen ‘awaiting diplomatic as
well as legal advices,’” a quotation that “strengthened the suspicions held
by a good many Harlingen people that the Jap situation had not
been ended.” “‘The next move is up to the Japs.’ That is the attitude of
Harlingen,” the Light reported. “‘We have told them we didn’t want them
and they have promised to move on’ said one man there this afternoon.
‘Instead they keep hanging around and palavering and hobnobbing with
themselves and sending telegrams and long distance messages.’”53
In addition, officials in Cameron County told the Japanese in Harlingen that the Texas Rangers, a state police force, would protect them if
51
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they dared to test the threats of violence. “Harlingen Legion men have
their doubts as to whether the offer came direct from rangers,” the Light
explained, “and think the Japs were merely told rangers would be
provided to guard them if they wanted to take possession of their land.”
Due to fear or distrust perhaps, the Okumas declined the protection,
prompting the Light to wonder what the effect would be “of the Jap
brothers at Harlingen to accept proffered assistance of the rangers.”54
Irrespective of the source of the offer of protection or the reason for its
refusal, the suggestion that the Rangers would protect the Japanese
marked a profound difference from their behavior in 1915 when the
Rangers perpetrated mass murder against ethnic Mexicans. It surely also
reflected the reorganization of the Rangers after an investigation into
their murderous conduct at that time.55
Throughout the country, commentators cautioned white Texans to
avoid violence that might generate friction between the two powerful
adversaries, the United States and Japan. Newspapers nationwide
published the relevant wire reports. One editorial expressed concern that
there was “a question . . . whether repetition of the Texas incident might
not cause a far greater flareback of Japanese opinion than” would more
“orderly processes.” Another worried that the “possibilities of international complications are seen, which may have an important bearing
on negotiations now in progress between the Japanese and United States
governments over the question of exclusion of orientals and the right of
those now in the country to own land.”56
When the Okumas finally left Harlingen after three weeks, they did so
on their own terms. In fact, they surprised their antagonists, who had no
information on the family’s whereabouts or destination. Furthermore, in
assessing the success of the Legion and its supporters in clearing the Valley
of Japanese settlers, a leader of the organization seemed to recognize the
impotence of his group when he asserted that the largely innocuous threats
had been the sum total of its intentions and, to a large extent, of its
capabilities. “The main idea,” he told the San Benito Light, was simply “to
let our little brown friends know that we are on the job. California had

“Are Anxious to Leave Valley,” San Benito Light, January 10, 1921, p. 1.
After an investigation in 1919 of this massacre of ethnic Mexicans, the state reorganized the
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plenty of laws but the Japs slipped in anyway. The Legion posts of the
Valley intend to see that California’s mistake is not repeated here.”57
Although whites in the Rio Grande Valley were pleased with the departure of the Okumas from Harlingen, they recognized that the victory was
incomplete: “The promises of a handful of Japs [do] not seem likely to solve
nor end our Japanese situation.” Solving the situation, many Valley whites
agreed, required legislation. After all, the Okumas “had a legal right” to their
land, as the Legion men themselves admitted. While they had succeeded in
delaying and expelling a small number of Japanese with threats, they now
needed “orderly processes” to stanch the flow of immigrants.58 In fact,
immediately after the arrival of the Okumas, Brownsville attorney Harbert
Davenport began to investigate legal ways of denying them occupancy. As
the San Antonio Express reported on January 8, 1921, Davenport “recalled
a Texas law passed in 1892, which denies the right to own land in Texas to
any non-resident alien.”59
Less than a week later, the American Legion utilized Davenport’s legal
finding as leverage to expel the Okumas by undermining the validity of
their deed. “The deed will be attacked on the ground that the Texas laws of
1892 prevent the sale of Texas lands to alien nonresidents,” explained the
Corpus Christi Times.60 The San Benito Light, given its opposition to
the Japanese, applauded the Legion for pursuing any method to keep the
immigrants out, declaring that it would be foolhardy “to imagine the Japs
will abandon so easily their efforts to establish themselves in this section.”
Furthermore, it emphasized the necessity of the law and the importance of
creating “a public sentiment so strong that no one, no matter how greedy
or how un-American will dare risk its wrath.”61
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As Valley whites stirred up support across the state for a legal
solution, on January 28 Senator Richard Moberley Dudley of El Paso
proposed an “anti-Japanese colonization bill” in the state senate (S.B. 142).
Dudley noted “the danger of Texas becoming overrun with Japanese and
said the measure he offered was modeled [after] the California exclusion act
prohibiting ownership of land by persons not eligible to become citizens.”62
In the first days of February, Harbert Davenport and other prominent white
people from the Valley departed for Austin to testify before the legislature
in behalf of the Dudley bill. As the measure moved toward passage, the San
Benito Light proudly reported the role of Valley residents in ensuring that
outcome: “Encouraged by telling points driven home by their witnesses in
the senate hearing of the Dudley . . . bill, members of the American Legion
from the Lower Rio Grande Valley today predicted the passage of that
measure or a suitable substitute.” State representatives likewise declared
that “‘the people of the Rio Grande Valley are determined to prevent the
settlement of their lands by Japanese, or other foreigners who do not
become in truth and in fact American citizens.’”63
By February 11 whites in the Valley were jubilant over two bits of
news. First, they learned that Yamada and Kishi, the broker and dealer
involved in the initial Valley land sale, had agreed to “pocket their loss and
abandon further efforts there”; and second, they heard “that the senate
legislative committee reported favorably on the Dudley anti alien land
law.”64 Then in rapid succession the legislature had passed the bill by
March 11—slightly revised and renamed the Pope bill to include its
Nueces County sponsor in the Texas House, Walter Elmer Pope. On April
1, Governor Pat M. Neff signed it into law, effective on June 11.65
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The legislation against the Japanese contained evidence of the
hysteria that gripped white Texans in the winter and spring of 1921.
Most of the law, of course, consisted of the unemotional language
typical of such legislation, even as it targeted the Japanese with unmistakable precision. It exempted Europeans (“Aliens eligible to
citizenship in the United States”) and citizens of Canada and Mexico
(“Aliens who are natural born citizens of nations which have a
common land boundary with the United States”) but banned the
Japanese—as they were not “eligible to citizenship in the United
States.” However, the final clause of the bill highlighted the fevered
emotions under which the legislation was hustled through: “The fact
that aliens who do not propose becoming citizens of the United States
are now attempting to acquire title to large bodies of fertile land in this
State creates an emergency and an imperative public necessity that this
bill shall and it hereby does take effect from and after its passage,
and it is so enacted.”66 It did not highlight the fact that the so-called
public emergency had been caused by a mere handful of Japanese
arrivals—most of whom had already been chased away. Clearly, this
emergency was no emergency at all.
Although the lawmakers ignored his testimony in the legislature,
Saburo Arai, a Japanese national and landowner living in Houston,
provided considerable insight into the views of many of the nearly five
hundred Japanese in Texas in 1921. Arai urged that “the committee
weigh the matter carefully before rendering [a] final decision.” He
stated that “although he was not a citizen it was only because that right
had been denied him and that he was confident he spoke the opinion
of hundreds of his race.” Recalling the expedition of Commodore
Matthew Perry in 1853, which forced Japan to engage with the world
after centuries of self-imposed isolation, Arai argued that the Japanese
emigrants saw this event as the salvation of their country of origin: “He
denied that the Japanese were aggressing upon the territory in the Rio
Grande Valley and declared that the Japanese looked upon the United
States as their benefactor and that it was through the influence of this
country that the gateway of Japan had been opened.”67
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Far less noble than the appeal from Arai was the racist hysteria engendered in Austin, in the Valley, and across the state during the debate
over the law, and its probable influence in the killing of a Japanese farmer,
I. Onishi, on June 10 near La Marque on the Gulf Coast, some three
hundred miles northeast of Harlingen. Onishi’s young son told investigators that he had discovered an unknown man peering through the
windows of his home, a stranger who demanded to see “the boss” of the
house. When Onishi walked out to meet him, the stranger gunned him
down and fled. Although “the boy was not able to say whether [t]he man
who shot his father was white or colored,” it is noteworthy that the
assassin killed Onishi around 8 p.m., just four hours before the antiJapanese law went into effect.68 As this killing suggests, Texans elsewhere used the hysteria surrounding the Valley confrontation to effect
their own purposes against Japanese settlers.
When the handful of Japanese arrived in the lower Rio Grande
Valley in January 1921, they arrived in the long shadow of the massacre
of ethnic Mexicans in 1915 and in the immediate aftermath of the
expulsion of African Americans from McAllen. The Japanese arrivals
amounted to just two or three dozen migrants, at least four of whom
were young children. Nonetheless, they were skilled farmers and
possessed capital sufficient to purchase hundreds of acres of land.
Although they had no legal right to U.S. citizenship, they did have the
support of a powerful and growing Japanese empire intent upon
protecting its emigrants in order to safeguard its own status internationally. Hence, the Japanese differed in key ways from both the
ethnic Mexicans and the local African Americans, differences that help
explain the sharp distinctions in their treatment at the hands of white
people in the Valley.
Unlike the Japanese, ethnic Mexicans inhabited the region in
numbers that significantly exceeded the white population, and some
migrated regularly back and forth across the Rio Grande. Dispossessed
of their land in Texas over the previous two decades or on the run from
the brutal revolution that had ravaged Mexico since 1910, ethnic
Mexicans in the Valley were largely unskilled laborers with very
limited assets. Some of them—the Mexican Americans—possessed
U.S. citizenship, and those who did not could obtain it under the
provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Even when
68
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individuals held U.S. citizenship, however, they were subject to a
decidedly second-class version as a result of Jim Crow practices.
Those ethnic Mexicans possessing Mexican citizenship could expect
limited diplomatic support from Mexico when targeted for violence
in Texas; however, given the weakness of that war-ravaged country,
white Texans felt at liberty to ignore such support altogether. Like
the Japanese, African Americans lived in the Valley in sparse
numbers, but in contrast, they were largely unskilled, suffered legally
mandated second-class citizenship, and could appeal to no foreign
governments—weak or strong—for protection. As a consequence of
these differences, white Texans could threaten the Japanese and ultimately drive them from the region with unrelenting hostility, but they
could not abuse them with the casual impunity that they enjoyed in their
dealings with ethnic Mexicans and black people. White Texans proved
this point with astonishing clarity in the weeks and months after the flight
of the Japanese from Harlingen.
After the murder of a white teenaged girl in Rio Hondo in February
1921, white posses rounded up dozens of ethnic Mexican suspects and
lynched Salvador Saucedo, a Mexican national. In its coverage the San
Benito Light claimed that the alleged crime in Rio Hondo had aroused
passions that exceeded those evidenced in 1915. Even during those
“stirring” days, it observed, there had “never [been] a crime that [had]
caused such widespread interest and public indignation.”69 A short
time later, in July 1921, whites drove an unknown number of black
people from Harlingen. Expressing his satisfaction with the expulsion,
a white resident declared, “‘I don’t know whether [the black people]
who are reported missing today had been doing any wrong. But I am
certain the community will not suffer any from their absence.’”70
Over the next sixteen months, mobs in Harlingen, Mercedes, and
Weslaco killed three more victims, all of whom, like Saucedo, were
Mexican nationals.71 After Mexican diplomats pressed the U.S. State
Department to investigate the lynching in Weslaco in 1922, whites in the
69
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Valley dismissed these protests with more violence by threatening
vengeance against the Mexican consul posted in Hidalgo. Amid these
mob-related threats and actions, Mexican officials furnished reporters
with a lengthy “list of Mexican nationals killed along the border in the
last eleven months for which no punishment has been meted out.”72
While white Texans in the Valley had deployed the recently
organized and very respectable American Legion against the
Japanese, they largely relied on branches of the far less reputable white
supremacist organization, the Ku Klux Klan, to take action against
ethnic Mexicans and African Americans. In the summer and fall of
1921, Klan chapters formed in Brownsville, Harlingen, Mercedes,
McAllen, and San Benito, prompted, perhaps, by the fear recently
provoked by the Japanese. At this point, the Legion and the Klan
apparently had similar memberships. In fact, the Invisible Empire
made its first appearance in one Hidalgo County town at an event for
the veterans’ group. “Mercedes got its first glimpse of Klansmen last
night when a long line of masked figures suddenly appeared” at the
height of a “street dance being staged by [the] American Legion post,”
wrote an observer. “The appearance of the Klan had a sobering effect
on the crowd of merrymakers. Dancing and music stopped and the
procession moved quietly down Texas Avenue and disappeared in the
darkness at the edge of town.”73 Yet white supremacists in the Valley
chose to deploy the Klan against African Americans and ethnic
Mexicans, a decision reflecting the real differences in white aggression against the Japanese.
Watching the drama against the Japanese migrants unfold in Texas in
early 1921, white Louisianans worried that the same Japanese migrants
driven from California and moving toward the Lone Star State might also
be attracted to agricultural settlement in Louisiana. As Louisiana
delegates rewrote the state constitution in the spring of 1921, they moved
72
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to block any such eventuality. “No Japanese is going to be allowed to
own land or mineral rights in the state of Louisiana,” predicted the
Shreveport Times. One of the chief proponents of the measure was
former governor and then state representative Jared Y. Sanders. “It is
better to act beforehand than to act too late,” he told committee members.
The man who introduced the ordinance, J. S. Dykes of Union Parish,
pointed to the events in the Rio Grande Valley as a cautionary tale.
“‘Louisiana has enough of radical conflict without continuing the
possibility of colonization by oriental people,’” he explained. “‘And the
recent trouble in Texas and the necessity for drastic action taken there to
prevent Japanese colonization would show that with the threat of expulsion from California impending, or at least a restriction upon rights
of ownersship [sic] of real property in that state, the Jap is beginning to
look elsewhere in the nation for location and settlement. We don’t want
h[i]m here!’”74
Next door in Mississippi, former governor and U.S. senator James
K. Vardaman applauded Louisiana for what he called “a very wise
precaution.” “If I had my way about things,” Vardaman editorialized, “I
would not permit any except members of the white race to own land in
this republic.” Although Mississippi did not follow Louisiana’s
example, the historian Stephanie Hinnershitz has found that cotton
planters in the state did support such a measure. In his editorial
Vardaman argued that “every state in the republic should follow
[Louisiana’s] example.” Like white Americans in the West, those along
a wide stretch of the Gulf South worried that Japanese immigration
presented an imminent threat and moved to neutralize it.75
To the west of Texas, in neighboring New Mexico, residents also
responded directly to the events in South Texas. “[T]he citizens of the San
Benito district of Texas have passed a series of resolutions and petitions to
be presented to the legislature asking for a bill to exclude aliens from
owning or leasing property in that state,” reported the Rio Grande Republic
in Las Cruces on January 13. As a result, it added, “The Dona Ana County
Farm Bureau of this state will soon take up the matter and from the
sentiment expressed a petition will be sent to the New Mexico legislature
74
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asking for protection from aliens for the lands in this state.”76 By September
1921, New Mexico, like Louisiana, had amended the state constitution
to include an alien land provision. Legislators in Arizona also responded
quickly to the anti-Japanese hysteria, probably because of the state’s
long border with California and the perceived threat of an influx of
migrants. In February 1921, Arizona lawmakers enacted their own antiJapanese legislation. Amazingly, the arrival of a few dozen Japanese
migrants from California in the Rio Grande Valley in 1921 directly
sparked the legal exclusion of these people from Texas, Louisiana, and
New Mexico, prompted its consideration in Mississippi, and stimulated
the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments across the Gulf South and in the
U.S. West.77
As this article has shown, whites in the Valley mobilized with extraordinary coordination and discipline to combat a very small influx of
immigrants, a mobilization that underscored the fears that whites entertained about the hard work and enviable thrift practiced by the Japanese
and, as whites interpreted those traits, the menacing trickery and duplicity
deployed by Japanese immigrants to the disadvantage of good, honest
white Americans. As a result of their efforts and the subsequent promulgation of the alien land law, the number of Japanese residents in Texas
in 1930 was only 519—up just slightly from 449 a decade before.78
Furthermore, led by figures of local prominence, white residents of the
Valley were cognizant of the distinctions in the relative power of the United
States and the home countries of those individuals targeted, and, significantly, they used that understanding in determining their tactics. With
war-torn and internationally weak Mexico, white Texans killed Mexican
nationals without fear of consequence. With a powerful, assertive Japan,
they intimidated the newcomers but did not resort to violence. Underscoring the prevailing view that ethnic Mexicans were a group easier to
control and exploit than the Japanese, the band of white men who visited the
Japanese farmer near Santa Maria advised him to fire any newly arrived
Japanese workers and to “employ Mexicans if he needed, as he alleged,
more farm hands.”79 Recognizing the geopolitical differences in these two
“brown” countries and treating their nationals accordingly, whites in the
Valley exemplified the validity of the argument made by historian Paul
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A. Gilje that mobs were fundamentally rational entities, not the irrational
forces so often imagined by scholars and laypersons alike.80
Affirming the finding that racist mobs tailored their actions to the relative
strength or weakness of an immigrant’s nation of origin, historians William
D. Carrigan and Clive Webb have found that a stabilizing Mexican government began to place diplomatic pressure on the United States to protect
Mexican citizens from American mobs shortly after the Mexican Revolution. Dubbing the 1920s the “Decisive Decade,” Carrigan and Webb argue
that Mexican officials, exploiting the fears of U.S. politicians and businessmen over the stability of foreign markets and the international reputation
of the United States, curbed vigilante violence to such an extent that the last
known killing of a Mexican citizen at the hands of a mob in the United States
occurred in Raymondville, Texas, in September 1926.81 Although Mexican
officials still did not possess the influence of their counterparts in Japan and
did see a number of their nationals lynched in the United States in the 1920s,
they achieved some success in providing protection for their expatriates. Yet
by placing their success into context with the much greater success of the
Japanese, this study demonstrates just how modest that achievement was.
Texas legislators responded quickly to a hysterical white outcry against
an extremely small group of Japanese migrants in the Valley by enacting
an anti-alien land law. In Louisiana and New Mexico, legislators reacted
to the same perceived threat and incorporated anti-Japanese provisions
into their state constitutions before the issue had even surfaced as a major
subject of debate in either state. Furthermore, the Florida legislature,
“taking a cue from Louisiana,” determined to lock out the Japanese with
its own alien land constitutional amendment in 1925. The next year, voters
ratified it. By that time, the three Gulf South states with the largest (if
minuscule) Japanese populations all had alien land provisions, and nearly
the entire Gulf Coast had banned Japanese settlement.82
By demonstrating that some white people encouraged rather than opposed Japanese settlement in the Valley and that the anti-Japanese majority
intimidated these so-called race-traitors into silence, this study shows that
both white supremacy generally and anti-Asian sentiments specifically
were not as monolithic as historians have often suggested. In this sense, it
affirms the work of historian Lon Kurashige, who has posited that the
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exclusion of Asian immigrants from U.S. citizenship and often from the
boundaries of the country was not the result of a solid consensus among
white Americans but the subject of a vigorous debate in which a white
minority—including prominent academics, religious leaders, businessmen,
and politicians—argued for the benefits of immigration from Asia. The
experience in the Valley also affirms the scholarship of historian David
C. Atkinson, who has demonstrated that, contrary to the prevailing views
of historians, collaborative anti-Asian immigration policies and practices among white-majority countries—the United States, Britain, and
white settler colonies like Canada and Australia—from the 1890s to the
1920s tended to sow divisions and tensions among them rather than to
advance the global white supremacy that these nations sought.83
After the murder of two Japanese immigrants and an attack with tar and
feathers on a Japanese national in California within two days in June 1924,
the press in Japan picked up these stories to critique what was regarded as
white American racism generally and anti-Japanese racism specifically.
“The year 1924 became a watershed for the Japanese view on lynching,”
writes historian Fumiko Sakashita, an insight magnified in Japan by the
recent passage by the U.S. Congress of the National Origins Act of 1924,
which banned Japanese immigration to the United States outright. While the
1920–1921 affair in the Rio Grande Valley did not attract the kind of anger
and comment in Japan that the California incidents of June 1924 did, this
study suggests that anti-Japanese mob intimidation, threats of violence, and
actual violence were neither uncommon nor confined to the West Coast.84
A growing number of studies address racist violence against Asian
Americans in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century United States. Not
surprisingly, much of this work focuses on the abuse directed at people from
China, a country that—like Mexico—was weak and could not, therefore,
exert the leverage necessary to curb violence against its nationals from the
1850s until at least the turn of the twentieth century. In their studies of antiChinese mob violence, Jean Pfaelzer and Beth Lew-Williams argue that,
while mobs did hang and shoot Chinese victims, white Americans more
commonly targeted Chinese immigrants for expulsion or exclusion.85 As
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this article shows, whites in the Valley were similarly reluctant to employ
lethal mob violence against the Japanese. Elsewhere, however, white
Americans did commit such violence on occasion, as historian Larry
R. Gerlach has established with the identification of a Japanese lynching
victim in Utah in 1884 and as Sakashita describes with the attacks in 1924
on Japanese victims—events that the Japanese press dubbed lynchings,
despite the nonlethal outcome of the tar-and-feathering incident.86
This article also intersects with a number of recent studies on Chinese
and Japanese migration in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America.87
These studies underscore the mobility of Chinese and Japanese expatriates and help explain Asian migrations across the Texas-Mexico
border in the early twentieth century, such as the one that brought a
number of Japanese migrants to San Antonio in 1907 and provoked such
turmoil there. Since much of the scholarship focuses on Chinese
migrants, this study advances the literature by focusing on Japanese
settlers and on the territory north of the Rio Grande.
Like the works of historians such as Neil Foley and Gerald Horne, this
article underscores the complex and heterogeneous quality of racial
demography and interracial relations in South Texas. In particular, it
foregrounds the varieties of white oppression against not only Japanese
immigrants but ethnic Mexicans and African Americans as well. Yet it
also demonstrates how racism and conflict undermined the relationships
among these racial minority groups, as illustrated by the struggle between
African Americans and Japanese immigrants in San Antonio and by the
expulsion of the black population from McAllen by the combined forces
of white and Mexican American residents. It also joins a growing body of
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scholarship, as represented by the works of Julian Lim and Grace Peña
Delgado, on multiracial relations along the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.88
Most of the scholarship on mob violence against Asian populations in
the United States focuses on the Mountain and the Far West regions, just
as much Asian American historiography does in general.89 With its
focus on South Texas, this essay instead orients the story toward the
South and the Gulf Coast, contributing to a trend evident in works such
as Asian Americans in Dixie: Race and Migration in the South, which
highlight the varieties of Asian American history in the region.90 In so
doing, this study also complicates and recasts the well-known issue of
racist mob violence in the South, repopulating a story usually focused on
white-black relations with persons of Japanese and Mexican American
descent. In reporting the push to exclude Japanese immigrants from
Texas through the alien land law, the Dallas Morning News portrayed the
state as leading the fight in freezing out a potential new competitor in the
South and predicted correctly that other states might emulate Texas’s
efforts: “It is admitted by all that the question is an important one and that
Japanese settlement in Texas looms up as one which might become of
great seriousness in the future and is pregnant of another race problem
that might have to be dealt with by the South in years to come.” Indeed,
whites elsewhere in the Gulf South quickly took up the issue and, in
Louisiana and Florida, took steps to ensure that this “race problem”
would not become a major issue in those states.91
While the focus in this article is on the South, white westerners likewise
moved expeditiously to freeze out potential Japanese newcomers. As
California drove out its Japanese residents, neighboring Arizona pushed
88
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through its own anti-alien legislation even as the dramatic events were
playing themselves out in South Texas, where some of the California
fugitives had fled. Responding to the events in the Lone Star State, New
Mexico—wedged between Arizona and Texas—wrote an anti-alien provision into its new state constitution.92 Even as this article provides insight
into anti-Japanese sentiment in the American West, however, it focuses on a
different West than the one usually examined by scholars, the West Coast.
The vast majority of scholarship on Japanese American history
focuses on the internment during World War II and on how
stereotypes of these people—and of East Asians generally—as inherently
unassimilable drove white Americans and the machinery of government
and law to suspend the rights of nearly every ethnic Japanese resident
and to imprison them as enemies of the state. With its focus on the
post–World War I period, this study demonstrates how the seeds of
the internment sprouted among the hysteria attendant to Japanese
population growth in 1920–1921, and how the anti-Japanese movements
across the country in this period drove the rising rancor between the
United States and Japan internationally, ultimately spawning the Pacific
war of 1941–1945 and the accompanying internment itself.
Finally, in showing how Japan could exercise its influence over
American politicians in the nation’s capital and over crowds of ordinary
white people in small towns in Texas, and that neighboring Mexico could
not, this essay confirms that the study of racist and mob violence in the
United States is a fundamentally international story rather than a narrowly
“American” one. In this sense, it builds on a handful of recent monographs
and edited volumes that treat racist intimidation, threats of violence, and
mob violence “historically and globally.” Certainly, studies of violence
targeted at ethnic Chinese, Chileans, Italians, and others will almost certainly show that the possibility of death for foreign nationals at the hands of
American mobs was directly related to the power and influence wielded by
the governments in their countries of origin and to the potential consequences for the American government and by extension for the perpetrators, an advantage clearly unavailable to most African Americans.93
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